To devise a methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of syndromic surveillance systems
Introduction
While results from syndromic surveillance systems are commonly presented in the literature, few systems appear to have been thoroughly evaluated to examine which events can and cannot be detected, the time to detection and the efficacy of different syndromic surveillance data streams. Such an evaluation framework is presented.
Methods
A number of possible public health scenarios were identified (e.g. outbreak of pandemic influenza, Cryptosporidium outbreak and deliberate anthrax release) and deterministic compartmental models were used to simulate the number of disease cases generated for a range of severities. Data were used from four national syndromic surveillance systems (a non-emergency medical number, emergency department records, and information from family doctor in and out of hours consultations) coordinated by Public Health England. For each of these four surveillance systems, simulation data were estimated based upon transmission models. Such simulation data were superimposed onto baseline syndromic surveillance data to create a test dataset. Random noise was added to these test data to represent expected variability. Existing statistical detection algorithms currently used for near-real time syndromic surveillance were used to evaluate these simulations. For each scenario, timeliness was assessed as the number of days between the start of the simulation and extra activity being detected by syndromic surveillance. Timeliness was assessed for a range of disease severities. The efficacy of different syndromic data streams and reported syndromes was assessed.
Results
An evaluation methodology was developed enabling the thorough evaluation of syndromic surveillance systems. Using the system developed for England this indicated that for an outbreak of pandemic influenza (AH1N1) a national family doctor-based syndromic system would be the first to detect such an event. Specific times to detection will be reported as well as results from Cryptosporidium outbreaks and anthrax events. The outputs are sensitive to changes in parametrization of the compartmental model and the proportion of people reporting to each data stream.
Conclusions
We have developed an effective methodology for the systematic evaluation of syndromic surveillance systems in terms of their ability to detect events and their timeliness to detection. We argue that this methodology can be widely adopted to provide more empirical analysis of the effectiveness of syndromic surveillance systems worldwide.
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